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Abstract
A complete analysis of a story's structure must rely on more
than a simple grammar of story components; it requires a
consideration of the characters' plans as they are stated or
implied in the story. Furthermore, it must be recognized that
these plans are characters' beliefs, and that beliefs about
interactions among plans are crucial determinants of a story's
structure. A notation system for representing interacting plans
is presented here and applied to a simple children's tale about
a fox and a rooster. Various phenomena that appear in this
story are described. For example, a character in conflict with
another may try to conceal his or her real plans or try to
deceive the other character into acting in a way that serves his
or her own interest at the other's expense. A character may
thus construct a plan that is intended to be believed by the
other, but is not actually carried out. Such a virtual plan
plays a central role in the fox and rooster story and is common
in other stories in which characters interact.
Analysis of Interacting Plans
2
Telling a story may be the most powerful way to communicate
an idea. An artful recounting of events not only reveals much
about the people involved, but also triggers generalizations
that reach far beyond the story itself. It is not surprising
then that numerous theories have arisen to explain the structure
of stories and how people understand them.
This paper is concerned with the processes of story
comprehension, in particular, with the use of structured
knowledge in building an interpretation of a story. Since the
approach taken here differs significantly from what has
traditionally fallen under the label "analysis of the structure
of narratives" it may be useful to show how it fits into a
scheme of ways to study narratives.
The most popular approach to analysis of narrative
structure in current psychology research literature is the story
grammar approach. Using this approach researchers observe that
the setting of a story is usually in the beginning, that
episodes within the story themselves have internal structure,
and so on. This is exemplified by (among many others) Propp
(1958) in his analysis of Russian folk tales, and more recently
by the work of cognitive psychologists such as Rumelhart (1975),
Mandler and Johnson (1977), Sutton-Smith, Botvin, and Mahoney
(1976), Stein and Glenn (1978), and Thorndyke (1977). Glossing
over, for the moment, important differences in structural
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analyses of this sort, we can say that they do capture important
regularities in story structure. For example, they can be used
to describe differences in the folk tales of different cultures,
or to describe developmental levels of story understanding.
What a story grammar approach fails to capture is the fact
that episodic structure is typically produced by interactions
among characters attempting to achieve goals. Any purely
syntactic approach, which ignores the effect of characters in
the story as active agents, will necessarily be incomplete in
its account of the story's structure. Specifically, it will
miss the underlying connections among syntactic units of the
story.
We are thus led to a second approach to the analysis of
story structure, one which analyzes characters' goals and plans.
Since we can never know what is in a character's mind, we must
infer plans on the basis of the character's actions, statements,
and whatever insight the author allows us into his or her mind.
Research on plans in stories (e.g., Wilensky, 1978; Schank &
Abelson, 1977; Bruce, 1975, in press) has moved towards
elaboration of the knowledge about plans and goals that a
character could be presumed to have in a given situation. This
study may lead to a partial explanation for the types of
structures that emerge from a story grammar.
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An analysis of characters' plans and goals is itself
incomplete unless it incorporates an analysis of the social
situation in which these plans arise. We cannot assume that a
character acts out of the context of other characters' actions.
Their actions may help or hinder or even be the target of the
first character. A character must plan and act with the
understanding that the other characters are also purposeful
creatures whose plans will likely interact with his or her own.
Recognition of the interdependencies among plans leads us as
analyzers of story structure to posit notions such as social
episode to represent the interactions among plans, e.g.,
cooperation and conflict.
But we must go still further. No one has direct access to
the true plan of another but can only hypothesize on the basis
of the other's actions. In order to plan, each character must
form a model of the plans of the other characters. We must have
a way to represent characters' beliefs about each others' plans
and to show how their beliefs affect their plans.
Finally, any character can realize that other characters
are not only active planners, but also active interpreters of
the interactive situation. He or she can then perform actions
to influence or discover the beliefs of others. What a
character believes that another believes can be crucial to the
structure of a story. Since beliefs can be about beliefs, we
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can have nested or recursive propositions such as A believes
that B believes that A believes P (see Cohen, 1978). This makes
possible things such as virtual plans, e.g., a plan that P
intends for Q to believe that P has, but that P does not intend
to carry out.
The facts that plans of characters in stories are
interdependent, that actions are based on beliefs, and that
beliefs are recursive lead to our third approach. The analysis
of interacting or social plans (as in Bruce & Newman, 1978) thus
becomes necessary for the complete analysis of story structure.
This paper discusses such an approach and applies it in the
analysis of a simple children's story.
The first section below gives a brief overview of the basic
concepts and the notation system to be used. It also introduces
the problem of embedding: how are beliefs about plans and other
beliefs used in forming new plans? This leads into a discussion
of different belief spaces and deception among characters. The
subsequent section is an application of an interacting plans
analysis to a portion of a simple children's story. Following
that is a discussion of the role of differences in beliefs and
expectations in the perception of interacting plans. In
particular, the notion of a critical belief is introduced to
account for major differences among readers in their
understanding of a story. The next section discusses
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limitations of this approach. The final section concludes by
suggesting some relations between story understanding and story
analysis.
Basic Concepts(1)
The representation of interacting plans involves the use of
a set of symbols within a space, known as a belief space, that
represents one character's model of the interactive situation.
The plans that are represented are those of the target character
and those that the target character believes that the other
character is carrying out or intending to carry out. Separate
models are required in the analysis to represent the points of
view of other characters. Within one character's model of the
situation there may be a mutual belief space. Any fact falling
within this space is believed by the target character to be
shared with the other character.
Figure 1 shows a schematic belief space organization for
one character's point of view in the story to be discussed in
detail in the next section. The areas of the diagram represent
different belief spaces for that character. For example, the
area "rooster's real plan" contains beliefs of the rooster that
(1) The discussion to follow assumes a two character narrative;
the notation can be generalized for more characters. A full
catalogue of the elements and other details of the notation
system can be found in Bruce and Newman (1978).
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he believes are not known to the other character (the fox). The
area labelled "fox's real plan" contains beliefs of the rooster
about the fox's beliefs. The shaded area in the middle contains
beliefs that the rooster believes are shared, or mutually
believed.
RB
'FOXS REAL \ FOXS "COINCIDING
PLAN PRETENDED PLAN MUTUAL BELIEF
ROOSTER'S
PRETENDED PLAN
.^
ROOSTER'S
REAL PLAN
Fig. 1. Belief spaces of the rooster, showing that the
rooster needs to separate his beliefs, the fox's beliefs, and
their shared beliefs.
An important type of mutual belief space is the social
episode. It represents a social activity in which both
participants have chosen to maintain a role. A character's role
includes the actions that the particular character (say, P)
expects to perform, and which P believes that the other
character expects P to perform. The role also includes the
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intentions that the other character could reasonably infer from
P's actions given the assumption that they are cooperating. In
the representation of a story in which there are no conflicting
plans, a character's model of the situation can be represented
entirely within such a mutual belief space. When conflicting
goals and deception are perceived by the character, his or
her model of the situation will show beliefs outside of the
mutual belief space.
Returning to Figure 1, we can see that the central area is
a mutual belief space. In fact, it is also a social episode
space; it contains beliefs of the participants that they are
engaged in a social interaction with prescribed roles. Notice
that the area is divided by a dashed line separating the roles
of the two characters. If there were no deception in the story,
then the social episode from the rooster's point of view would
coincide with the social episode from the fox's point of view.
We could then speak of their coinciding mutual beliefs and
discuss the story without reference to their respective private
beliefs. In fact, even where deception is involved, there are
usually many coinciding mutual beliefs, e.g., that both parties
are physically present, that certain utterances have been made,
that certain physical states hold. In Figure 1, such truly
shared beliefs are contained in the area of coinciding mutual
beliefs. Most of the subsequent discussion, however, will focus
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on non-coinciding beliefs, i.e., beliefs that comprise the real
and pretended plans of the characters.
The description of interacting plans ultimately rests upon
two basic types of entities, states, represented by ovals, and
acts, represented by rectangles (see Figure 2 for examples).
Acts and states can be either simple or complex (internally
structured). While simple states and acts are represented as
primitive in a particular diagram, there is no assumption of an
absolute, primitive level. Instead, we choose a level of
representation appropriate for the context of a given plan.
Complex states are represented by an embedding of a state oval
in a larger oval indicating: that a character believes (B) that
the state holds, that a character intends to maintain (M) the
state, or that a character intends to achieve (A) the state.
The embedded state may be a complex state; thus we might have a
state representing P's intention to achieve the state of Q's
intending to maintain some state (see example in Figure 2).
Complex acts are formed from simple (or complex) acts in
patterns of various sorts, such as enabling chains, i.e., each
act in the chain enables the doing of the subsequent act.
Tags are used to mark the temporal, or the
real-hypothetical status of the states and acts. For example,
in a subsequent figure temporal tags are used to order the acts
in an episode. There can also be various relations among
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states and acts (shown as labelled arrows). Some important
relations are shown in Figure 2: "Specifies" indicates that a
general intention generates a more specific intention; "By Means
Of" indicates that an intention is carried out by an act;
"Produces" indicates that a state (or states) causes another
state; and "Has Effect" indicates that an act has a given state
as its outcome.
Fig 2. Initiation of a social episode. P and Q are the two
participants in the social episode. The embedded ovals
represent intentions to achieve (A) or to maintain (M) some
state, including, possibly, some other intention. The square
box represents the utterance P uses to initiate the episode.
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It should be emphasized that acts, states, tags, and
relations are the target character's conception of aspects of
the environment. This requirement lays the foundation for
different levels of characterization of the same event. People
respond to their conception of another's actions. Mismatched
conceptions may lead to conflicts, or may be the result of
deception.
One of the findings of our interacting plans analysis is a
set of configurations built out of the states, acts, and
relations. Each configuration is a generalization taken from
analyses of social interactions in stories or recorded
dialogues. To illustrate, one important configuration is the
initiation of a social episode, as shown in Figure 2. The
episode is labelled in the state node at the top. The
intentions and actions which constitute the roles of the two
characters (P and Q) are differentiated by a dashed line
dividing the mutual belief space. A social episode can be said
to commence when the two (or more) participants each have the
intention to maintain the episode. Typically, an episode is
initiated by means of a speech act, e.g., P says, "Let's do
.... " When successful, the initiation produces an intention in
the hearer, in this case, Q, to maintain the episode. Q's
intention, plus P's corresponding intention, establishes the
existence of the episode. This in turn implies a new belief
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space, namely, a set of beliefs shared between the participants.
One of these beliefs is that the initiation act is precisely
that: an act to create the mutual belief space in which it
resides.
Given the elements for representing basic plans, i.e.,
states, acts, tags, and relations, plus the catalog of
configurations, plus the facility for representing multiple
embedded belief spaces, we can begin to describe the more
involved aspects of interacting plans. One of these higher
level constructs is the virtual plan. This is a plan that one
character (say, P) constructs and attempts to get another
character (Q) to believe. It is indistinguishable from a real
plan except that P intends for Q to believe the plan while P
does not believe it. In most cases, parts of the virtual plan
e
are identical with parts of a real plan; P really intends to
carry them out, but the plan as a whole, or critical parts of
it, are not real. Virtual plans thus lay the foundation for
deception, a surprisingly common aspect of stories in which
characters interact. Double deception occurs when a character
pretends to be deceived; parallel deception when each character
addresses a virtual plan to the other, as in O'Henry's "The Gift
of the Magi."
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An Interacting Plans Analysis
The Story
The principal features of the interacting plans approach
can be seen in the analysis of a simple children's story, here,
the story of a fox and a rooster (adapted from Firman & Maltby,
1918):
THE FOX AND THE ROOSTER
1. Once a dog and a rooster went into the woods.
2. Soon it grew dark.
3. The rooster said, "Let us stay here all night. I will sleep
in this tree-top. You can sleep in the hollow trunk."
4. "Very well," said the dog.
5. So the dog and the rooster went to sleep.
6. In the morning the rooster began to crow, "Cock-a-doodle-do!
Cock-a-doodle-do!"
7. Mr. Fox heard him crow.
8. He said, "That is a rooster crowing. He must be lost in the
woods. I will eat him for my breakfast."
9. Soon Mr. Fox saw the rooster in the tree-top.
10. He said to himself, "Ha! ha! Ha! ha! What a fine breakfast
I shall have! I must make him come down from the tree. Ha!
ha! Ha! ha!"
11. So he said to the rooster, "What a fine rooster you are!
How well you sing! Will you come to my house for
breakfast?"
12. The rooster said, "Yes, thank you, I will come, if my friend
may come, too."
13. "Oh yes," said the fox. "I will ask your friend. Where is
he?"
14. The rooster said, "My friend is in this hollow tree. He is
asleep. You must wake him"
15. Mr. Fox said to himself, "Ha! ha! I shall have two roosters
for my breakfast!"
16. So he put his head into the hollow tree.
17. Then he said, "Will you come to my house for breakfast?"
18. Out jumped the dog and caught Mr. Fox by the nose.
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We will examine the portion of the story (lines 8 through
15) wherein the fox attem'pts to lure the rooster down from the
tree. There are three levels to the analysis. First, there is
the surface interaction -- two characters arranging a social
engagement. Second, there is the fox's real plan, in which he
makes use of familiar social conventions to attain his ulterior
goals. Third, there is the rooster's real plan, a double
deception, which plays upon both the conventional plan and the
fox's poorly hidden plan. In the process of considering these
different levels of plans (and beliefs about plans) we need to
observe the structure of the plans, but more importantly, how
the various plans interact.
The Surface Interaction
In nearly every interesting story there are. interactions
among characters occurring at multiple levels. An analysis of
story structure should reflect the different levels of
interaction, partly because each level may be important by
itself to an understanding of the story, but also because
characters can use shared understandings at one level to achieve
goals at a deeper level.
In our example story, the fox uses a shared understanding
about the social conventions surrounding the breakfast
invitation to mask his real plan to devour the rooster.
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Similarly, the rooster relies on these shared beliefs to mask
his real plan (to stay alive) and to pretend to be deceived.
Thus, while the surface level interaction "having breakfast
together" is a goal of neither the fox nor the rooster, we need
to understand what each of the protagonists believes about the
interaction in order to see the form of their real plans.
The surface level interaction is important in another
sense. In order for a character to carry out one plan while
appearing to do another, he or she must ensure that the virtual
plan mimics ordinary social reality as closely as possible. Our
study of a virtual plan thus becomes a study of the forms of
ordinary social interaction. Most of the comments on the form
of a virtual plan will necessarily extend to general social
interaction.
In "The Fox and the Rooster," much of the interaction is
built around the "breakfast" episode. As mentioned above, this
episode is never accomplished and never intended to be
accomplished by either participant, but if it were carried out,
it would have the form as shown in Figure 3. On the left side
are the fox's actions: inviting, going home, and having
breakfast. On the right side are the rooster's: accepting the
invitation, leaving the tree, going to the fox's house, and then
also eating breakfast. The empty slot indicates that the role
of the rooster could have been filled by any character; that is,
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the fox is initiating what should be a familiar pattern of
social interaction, inviting someone to share a meal. Invoking
this plan simplifies the fox's interaction with the rooster. He
needs only to say, "Will you come to my house for breakfast?",
in order to call up in the rooster (and thus communicate) the
appropriate sequence of actions, beliefs, and role
characteristics for the complex activity of sharing breakfast.
Fig. 3. The ordinary breakfast plan. Each box represents
an act to be performed by either the fox (F) or the guest.
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That the fox's plan is succeeding (in his view of the
world) is partly confirmed when the rooster says, "Yes, thank
you, I will come, if my friend may come, too." This shows
first, that the rooster is responding in an episode appropriate
way, and second, that he is suggesting a modification to the
episode that is compatible with its detailed structure. In
Figure 4, we can see that the rooster has, by his utterance, put
himself in the "someone" slot and then altered the episode to
include his friend. The episode shown in Figure 4 is simply an
elaboration of that shown in Figure 3. The rooster does not
appear to disturb the fox's basic plan. In particular, he does
not disturb the outcome desired by the fox, i.e., "R with F" (or
rooster with fox).
In the figure, all the boxes except one are dashed,
indicating that those acts are not intended to be executed. The
one box labeled " leave tree" and the oval labeled "
with F" are solid, indicating that the act of leaving the tree
in order to be with the fox is part of the fox's real plan. In
fact, this act is part of both his real plan and his virtual
plan. The virtual plan is constructed around it to make it
appear less dangerous than it really is.
Figures 3 and 4 show only the actions to be performed by
the participants in the breakfast episode. They do not show
either their intentions or the changing state of the world while
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they are doing these actions. This pictorial simplification was
done to highlight the sequence of (virtual) actions. In
subsequent diagrams we will need to look more closely at the
specific intentions of the fox, and then the rooster, for the
story moves, not by the virtual actions, nor even by the real
actions alone, but by the conflicting intentions of the
characters.
Fig. 4. The breakfast plan as modified by the rooster. The
subscripts mark the temporal order for the acts.. In the fox's
real plan only acts t1 through t6 are expected to be done; in
the rooster's real plan only acts tl through t5 are expected.
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The Fox's Plan: Deception
The fox wants to have a breakfast, not with the rooster,
but of the rooster. As one ten year old explained, "He's going
to be the breakfast!" How does the fox get the rooster to
cooperate and come down from the tree? His plan is simple: make
the rooster believe that the fox is friendly and that it is all
right to engage in an ordinary social interaction with him. The
ordinary social interaction plan will be virtual, since the fox
never intends to carry it out; his real plan is to eat the
rooster.
Since the fox is being deceptive, he has both real and
virtual intentions. A diagram of his beliefs shows two complete
plans, one real and one virtual, such that the real plan can be
overlaid on the virtual plan, matching at crucial points.
Figure 5 is a simplified sketch of such an overlay. Intentions
shown in the figure are in solid lines if they are part of the
real plan, and in dashed lines if they are only in the virtual
plan.
In the figure, higher or more general intentions are on the
left, specifying other intentions as one scans to the right.
The "Specifies" relation holds between the general and the more
specific intentions. The dashed vertical line separates the
fox's role in the episode from the rooster's. Thus the states,
"rooster believes fox is friendly," and "rooster intends to
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maintain role in episode" are shown to the right of the line.
Each of the other embedded ovals represents an intention of the
fox.
F HAVERes Specifipeeses
FOR FOX 1 ROLE IA
EAT BREAKFAST PERSUADE ROOSTER
WITH ROOSTER TO EAT WITH FOX FOX MAINTAIN
BREAKFAST EPISODE cBy Meons Of SAYS.
F IS  LIKES -0 HOW ELL
FOX INVITE ALFOOSTR IONTE
Fig. 5. The Fox's real plan. This is an overlay of the
fox's real plan (in solid lines) and his virtual plan (in dashed
lines). The embedded ovals represent intentions to achieve (A)
a state, intentions to maintain (M) a state, or beliefs (B).
The vertical dashed line separates the fox's (F) role in the
episode from the rooster's (R).
Reading from left to right, we see that the fox's intention
to have the rooster for breakfast can be achieved if the rooster
is near. This specifies an intention to have the rooster near,
which, in turn, specifies another intention, to.get the rooster
to want to eat with the fox. This intention to create an
Analysis of Interacting Plans
21
intention conveniently happens to be one which is specified by
the highest level virtual intention (shown in dashed lines at
the far left), namely, that the fox and rooster will eat
together.
The coincidence of the real and the virtual plans means
that henceforth most of the more specific intentions can serve a
dual role; i.e., by furthering the virtual plan they
automatically further the real plan. For example, it is
appropriate to both the (virtual) breakfast plan and to the
(real) eating-rooster plan to invoke a strategy of the following
form (cf. Figure 5):
A PERSUASION STRATEGY
If you want to get person P to do A, then
(1) convince P that you are friendly, and
(2) either
(a) ask P to do A, or
(b) ask P to do B, where A is a sub-plan of B
For the virtual plan, the act, A, is "eat breakfast with fox."
For the real plan, A is "leave tree" and B is "eat breakfast
with fox" (as in Figures 3 and 4). To fulfill the virtual plan,
the fox needs to convince the rooster that he is friendly.
Since his real plan depends upon fulfillment of the virtual
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plan, convincing the rooster that he is friendly also helps to
fulfill the real plan. Note however, that one intention for the
fox, namely, maintaining his role in the episode, must remain
simply virtual and not serve a dual role.
The fox's plan is thus a two level interacting plan. At
one level he appears to be carrying out the ordinary interaction
of inviting someone to breakfast. At a deeper level, he is
using the same actions to fulfill his real goal of eating the
rooster. These two levels can be explained as existing
simultaneously, but in different belief spaces. The breakfast
episode, i.e., the ordinary interaction which has a virtual
status, is in a mutual belief space. The fox believes that the
rooster believes that the episode is legitimate and fully
shared. The fox's real plan is, however, (so he believes) known
only to himself.
The Rooster's Plan: Double Deception
The rooster does not want to be breakfast. In fact, he
probably does not even want to have breakfast with the fox. On
the other hand, we may assume that the rooster foresees that a
simple refusal on his part will simply force the fox to try
another plan. To get rid of the fox permanently the rooster
must pretend to be fooled.
Analysis of Interacting Plans
23
Figure 6 shows the rooster's real plan. It is simple in
terms of the number of intentions, but quite complex in terms of
its embedded structure. In this case, the highest level
intentions are on the right and we read from right to left. One
might imagine a giant diagram incorporating Figures 3-6 in which
the fox's intentions come from the left side of the page towards
the middle and the rooster's come from the right towards the
middle. Across the dashed line separating their plans we can
see the evidence of conflict. In fact there need to be two such
diagrams, one for the rooster's point of view and one for the
fox's. In this section we focus on the rooster's plan as he
knows it.
The rooster, in order to get rid of the fox, must get the
fox to modify his plan. But the modification cannot be in terms
of the fox's real plan, because the rooster is not supposed to
know about that (although he clearly does). Thus the rooster
must make the fox modify the surface (virtual) plan in such a
way that the real plan will be foiled, all without the fox's
suspecting.
Analysis of Interacting Plans
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ROOSTER CONVINCE
FOX THAT ROOSTER
IS GULLIBLE
ROOSTER CONVINCE
FOX THAT <FRIEND>
WOULD BE GULLIBLE, TOO
Fig. 6. The rooster's real plan. The rooster (R) is
attempting a complex deception on the fox (F), which relies on a
difference in beliefs about the identity of <FRIEND>.
The rooster develops his plan through the involvement of a
third character, the dog, but for our purposes here we can
consider the dog to be outside of the interactive situation. In
fact, one can assume that the dog knows nothing and bites the
fox solely in response to being awakened. To get the dog
involved, the rooster needs to get the fox to see an advantage
for himself in including the dog. Because the rooster
presumably believes that foxes know that dogs are their enemies,
he cannot even suggest that the dog is present. Instead, he
)
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refers to the dog as his "friend," allowing the fox to believe
that the friend is another rooster. The fox can then fall into
the trap of greed, believing that the plan that is apparently
working on rooster number one will work as well on rooster
number two.
In Figure 6, we see that the rooster's intentions are
actually intentions to create intentions in the fox, e.g., get
the fox to want to eat "friend," then get the fox to want to try
the breakfast plan on "friend." Conveniently for the rooster,
he can suggest modifications in the fox's basic deceptive plan
by the same actions (utterance) he uses to pose as one deceived
by the fox's plan. Thus, the rooster is practicing deception on
the fox, just as the fox attempts to on the rooster, but he also
practices a double deception in that he leads the fox to believe
that the rooster has been deceived.
Structure in Terms of Belief Spaces
Consideration of the plans of the characters in even the
simple story of the fox and the rooster shows that plans cannot
be viewed solely as tree or graph diagrams relating acts,
states, intentions, and so on. Instead, they must be seen as
belief structures that relate to other belief structures. In
every story, a character's plan has to be considered as part of
that character's beliefs, or part of another character's beliefs
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about the first character's beliefs, or part of some other
belief space. In fact, we can understand much of a story's
structure by the belief space organization without referring to
the detailed structure (of acts and states) that is usually
considered to be the analysis of a plan.
Let us return to look at Figure 1 for part of the belief
space organization of "The Fox and the Rooster." The diagram
represents what we assume that the rooster believes (RB). A
similar, but simpler, diagram would be needed for the fox (FB).
The innermost part of the diagram, labelled "coinciding mutual
belief" contains beliefs shared by the rooster and the fox and
known by each to be shared. This includes the part of the
breakfast episode that is not virtual, for example, the mutual
awareness that particular utterance acts have occurred. If
there were no deception in the story, then this would be the
complete belief space organization. The two boxes, labeled
"fox's pretended plan" and "rooster's pretended plan," hold
those parts of the breakfast episode that are virtual, e.g.,
that the fox intends to serve breakfast to the rooster, or that
the rooster intends to leave the tree. Notice that if this were
a diagram of the fox's beliefs, we would not have a "rooster's
pretended plan."
To the left of "coinciding mutual belief" is the fox's real
plan, as it is known to the rooster. The rooster might reason
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as follows: Because the fox thinks he is -succeeding in his
deception, his real plan is in his direct beliefs (FB) but not
in what he believes the rooster believes about him (FBRBFB).
Because the fox's deception fails, these beliefs are in fact in
RBFB, i.e., the rooster knows the plan, and since the rooster
thinks the fox thinks he has fooled the rooster, the plan is not
in RBFBRBFB, i.e., the rooster believes that the fox believes
that the rooster does not know the fox's real plan. To the
right is the rooster's real plan, the double deception. Since
his plan works, these beliefs are only in RB (and not in FBRB).
In order to understand this story, a reader has to keep
track of the (changing) belief space organization, marking
beliefs as held by rooster, fox, dog, or reader. Since a belief
can be about a belief, the reader also has to place each belief
in appropriate embedded spaces, say, the rooster's beliefs about
the fox's beliefs about the rooster's beliefs (RBFBRB). Such
ongoing auditing of beliefs is more than just an interesting
game that occurs during reading; in many cases it is the very
foundation for understanding the essence of the story.
Author-Reader-Character
Things are never as simple as they seem. We have been
discussing "The Fox and the Rooster" as if there were only one
possible interpretation -- as if all readers reach the same
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conclusions and as if the author were simply reporting the
"facts" about an event. There are, in fact, no "facts" in a
story. Instead, we have sentences produced by an author that
are used by a particular reader to manufacture a model of
events, a model that includes models presumably manufactured by
the characters. The reader also must consider that the story is
a directed set of events; the author is actively choosing what
to say and when to say it. Thus we need to consider the belief
spaces of the implied author and of the implied reader as well
as those of the characters.
One consequence of the expanded view which includes implied
author and implied reader is that different interpretations of
the same story can be more easily compared. For example, in
"The Fox and the Rooster," many people (especially, but not
exclusively, very young ones) arrive at a radically different
interpretation from the one presented above. They see the
rooster as the fool who survives through chance. As one ten
year old said, "Roosters are dumb animals! They have pointed
heads." It is as if she could imagine the rooster chiding the
dog, "You shouldn't have bitten nice Mr. Fox. He was inviting
us to breakfast."
In terms of our interacting plans analyses the choice
between the two interpretations of the story appears to hinge on
a single belief. This critical belief is that the reader
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believes that the rooster believes that foxes like to eat
roosters and that the rooster uses this belief in concocting his
plan. Without the critical belief, one could easily arrive at
the "dumb rooster" theory about the story, a theory which leads
to major differences in the perceived story (although not in the
tree structure that would come from a story grammar analysis).
The diagram of the rooster's beliefs under the dumb rooster
interpretation is not the complex structure shown in Figure 1,
but simply the structure of coinciding mutual belief.
Differences among readers in their critical beliefs may
arise from differing literary experiences or from general
cultural differences. We found in protocol analyses of children
reading "The Fox and the Rooster" that their experience with
fables about foxes affected the way they interpreted the story.
This merely corroborates some more general findings about
cross-cultural differences in text comprehension (Bartlett,
1932; Steffensen, Jogdeo, & Anderson, 1978; Kintsch & Greene,
1978).
Limitations
The notation system presented here has some inherent
limitations. For one, while it is straightforward to represent
elaborate interactions between any two characters, it is not
easy to represent three-way (or greater) way interactions
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clearly. Another limitation involves changes in beliefs as the
story proceeds. In many cases, one can either assume that
important beliefs do not change during the course of the story,
or else pick a point in the story, say, just before a climax,
and analyze the story at that point. Otherwise, a set of belief
space representations is needed, one for each point in time.
This can become quite cumbersome. Also, the representations
show the full result of planning, but only a sketch of the
process of planning. For a single character plan a
representation of the steps of planning is neither serious nor
problematical. For social plans, however, we need to have a
better way of capturing the dynamics involved in the creation
and maintenance of a social reality.
Another point to remember is that a single interacting
plans diagram represents only one interpretation of a story. To
compare alternative interpretations, we need separate complete
diagrams, and, of course, we can never be sure that a different
critical belief would not lead to yet another interpretation.
Also, some stories may achieve their effect by deliberate
ambiguity in the interactions among the characters.
A final caution concerns the relationship of an interacting
plans analysis to literary analysis in general. While the
approach outlined in this paper contributes to an understanding
of structural and plot-like aspects of a story, it has little to
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say about numerous other aspects, such as theme, allegory,
rhythm, irony, character development, and the like. A
limitation of this sort is important to keep in mind as a
restriction on any analysis of structure or character's plans.
One can hope, however, that by making explicit the
belief-embedded nature of plans that we may more easily link a
structural analysis to other accounts of a story.
Conclusion
This paper presents a way to analyze stories that is
concerned with (1) the structures that relate actions,
utterances, and thoughts of characters, (2) the plans of
characters that may be inferred from their actions, and (3) the
social and subjective aspects of those plans. By emphasizing
the roles of beliefs and interactions among plans, this approach
gives a richer and more direct account of story structure than
one could obtain by either a purely structural account or a
consideration of simple plans.
One might well ask whether the interacting plans approach
is then a way to study stories or a way to study story
understanding. I would argue that with respect to interacting
plans such a distinction is at best tenuous. The processes that
a story analyzer needs to engage in happen to be a subset of
those that any reader needs to do. Any reader needs to build a
Analysis of Interacting Plans
32
model of the plans of characters as they exist in the belief
spaces of the characters. This model building may not be
conscious, or as explicit as we have made it here, but in order
to say, "The rooster fooled the fox," the reader must construct
a rich model of the fox's and the rooster's beliefs about each
others' plans and beliefs. Interacting plans analysis is
therefore the reader's guide, as well as ours, to understanding
the structure of a story.
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